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On Judicial Policymaking and
Constitutional Change: Another
Look at the "Original Intent"
Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation
By DEAN ALFANGE, JR.*

GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. By Raoul Berger. Cambridge
and London: Harvard University Press (1977). xii + 483 pp. $15.00.
For his most recent book,' Raoul Berger has borrowed his title,
without acknowledgment, from the vigorous attack on judicial activism

2
by Louis Boudin published in two volumes forty-five years ago.

Boudin's study relied on an extensive canvass of historical materials to
support the author's conclusions that the framers of the Constitution

had not authorized judicial review, and that judges decided cases on
the basis of their own policy preferences rather than adherence to the
text and intended meaning of the Constitution. Despite the cogency
and power of much of its argument, Boudin's work has been described
as an "eccentric" study,3 and it seems probable that the same adjective
will in time be widely applied to Berger's book.
As the title of his book clearly suggests, Berger shares Boudin's
view that the Supreme Court has been using its power to interpret the
Constitution for the purpose of creating a body of law that corresponds
with the justices' conception of wise policy rather than actual constitutional commands. However, in contrast to Boudin's hostile reaction to
the actual rulings of the Supreme Court, Berger does not quarrel with
the substantive rules laid down by the Warren Court in its interpreta* Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
1. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter cited as BERGER].
2. L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932).

3. L. LEVY, JudicialReview, History, andDemocracy.An Introduction, in JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE SUPREME COURT 4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LEVY].
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tion of the Fourteenth Amendment--except that those rules were established by the illegitimate process -of judicial amendment of the
Constitution. As Berger pointedly notes, he had written as early as 1942
that he "liked it no better when the Court read [his] predilections into
the Constitution than when the Four Horsemen read in theirs,"'4 and he
remains faithful tothat view. Moreover, unlike Boudin, Berger does
not argue that judicial review itself is in any way improper. In an earlier work,5 he reviewed the history of the drafting and ratification of
the Constitution and concluded both that the historical record was not
"vague and conflicting," as other scholars had found it,6 and that it
demonstrated convincingly that "judicial review was contemplated and
provided for by the Framers."7
Nevertheless, as Berger sees it, the power of judicial review
granted to the courts is nothing more than an authorization to police
the boundaries of the Constitution in order to insure that Congress, the
President, and the states act within the limits of their prescribed powers. It is emphatically not a grant of authority to alter the Constitution
one iota from the precise meaning its framers intended it to have.
Therefore, Berger insists, "judicial amendment of the Constitution" is
the only proper phrase with which to deicribe the transformation of the
Fourteenth Amendment brought about by Warren Court rulings in this
area, particularly those relating to desegregation," suffrage, 9 reapportionment, 10 the protection of individual liberties against state encroachmet," and federal review of state criminal procedure. 12
Government by Judiciaryonce again demonstrates that Raoul Berger's forte is the examination and elucidation of the drafting and ratification of constitutional provisions for the purpose of ascertaining the
4. BERGER, supra note 1, at 4 (citing Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post-Mortem; 9 U.
CHI. L. REV. 602, 604-05, 642 (1942)).
5. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969).
6. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1-16 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
BICKEL]; LEVY, supra note 3, at 1-12; Westin, Introductionto C. BARD,THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE CONSTrrUTION 34 (1962 ed.) [hereinafter cited as Westin]. See also Edward S. Corwin's
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee that considered Franklin Roosevelt's courtpacking plan, printed in Reorganization ofthe FederalJudiciary:Hearingson S. 1392 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,75th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 167-224 (1937). But see E. CORWIN,
THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REviEw (1914).
7. BERGER, supra note 1, at 355 (emphasis in original).
8. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
10. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
11. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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original intention of the framers.13 The first of the book's two parts
consists principally of an analytical review of the discussions in the
Thirty-Ninth Congress preceding the submission of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the states for ratification. From this review, Berger disputes those historians who have viewed section one of the amendment
as embodying the desire of the abolitionists to guarantee blacks full
social and political equality. 4
Instead of seeking to constitutionalize the principle of racial equality, Berger argues, the "radical Republicans" who were responsible for
drafting the Fourteenth Amendment desired only to provide an adequate constitutional underpinning for the Civil Rights Act of 1866,15
which provided that citizens of the United States
of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery. .

. ,

shall have the same right .

.

. to make and enforce

contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.16

The purpose of this act, in Berger's view, was to nullify the Black
Codes that had been enacted by former secessionist states in order to
place the newly emancipated blacks in a practical, if not legal, status of17
servitude by denying them the "fundamental rights" enumerated.
Under this view, the three main clauses of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment--dealing, respectively, with privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection8 -- were intended to do no more
than provide constitutional protection for the precise rights set forth in
13. For earlier examples of his efforts in this respect, see R. BERGER, CONGRESS v. THE
SUPREME COURT (1969); R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974);
R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973).
14. Those whose historical analyses are the principal targets of Berger's criticism are Howard Jay Graham, Jacobus tenBroek, and Alfred Kelly. See H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION (1968); J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965); Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment
Reconsidered,54 MICH. L. REv. 1049 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Kelly].
15. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.

16. Id.
17. For Berger's discussion of the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see BERGER,
supra note 1, at 22-36.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
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the Civil Rights Act, and for no others. Far from being motivated by
abolitionist sentiment, Berger asserts, the radical Republicans were
stringently limited by the political reality that the people of the northern states, whom they represented, were opposed to any proposal to
grant blacks equal social or political status. These men, he writes,
"were swayed by the racism that gripped their constituents rather than
by abolitionist ideology,"1 9 and, as a result, they intended that the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment should be very narrow in
scope.
Berger does not rest his historical argument on undocumented assertions. He quotes extensively and repeatedly from the statements of
individual senators and representatives in the course of the debates preceding the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and the various
pieces of civil rights legislation that were considered in 1866; these quotations comprise a major portion of Part I of the book, almost 250
pages.2" The repetitiveness of the quotations is tiresome, but it is Berger's purpose to show how many statements by different legislators expressed the understanding that the actions of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress in providing constitutional and legal protection for blacks
were to be very restricted in scope, and the cumulative impact of these
quotations is impressive.
It must be conceded that many of Berger's conclusions on specific
historical points are not easily challengeable. His argument that section
one of the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to guarantee voting rights to blacks in states that chose not to enfranchise them, for
example, is supported not only by numerous quotations from members
of Congress expressing that view, 2' but also by the refusal of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress to require Tennessee to provide equal suffrage
for blacks as a condition of readmission to the Union 22 by the provisions of section two of the amendment, which calls for a reduction in
the congressional representation of any state in proportion to the percentage of the male citizens of the state to whom the right to vote is
denied 23 (a provision implying that the inherent power to deny that
19. BERGER, supra note 1, at 10.

20. Id.at 1-245.
21. See id.at 58-60.
22. See id at 59-60.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, states in pertinent part:
But when the right to vote... is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such

State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall
bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
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right was conceded), and by the perceived need subsequently to adopt
the Fifteenth Amendment in order to guarantee black suffrage.2 4 Similarly, despite the contrary evidence in the statements by Representative
Bingham of Ohio and Senator Howard of Michigan that were utilized
25
by Justice Black as the basis for his dissent in Adamson v. California,
it is all but certain that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to
incorporate the Bill of Rights and thus to revolutionize the administration of criminal justice in the states. If that had been the framers' intent,
surely some member of Congress would have objected to such a sweeping change going so far beyond the measures necessary to protect the
civil rights of blacks, some opposition would have been manifested in
the state legislatures when the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was debated, and some call would have been made that the states
begin complying with the mandates of the Bill of Rights as soon as the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The fact that none of these
events occurred seems to provide ineluctable proof that incorporation
was not intended. 6
Nevertheless, debates over legislative history and the originally intended meaning of ambiguous texts never cease. Although most of the
scholars whose interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment Berger
most vigorously attacks are now deceased and thus unable to offer rebuttals, there is so much available historical material pertaining to the
adoption of the amendment and to the history of the Reconstruction
era, and so many alternative ways in which that material may be interpreted, that it is certain that Berger will not be allowed to have the last
word. Yet the fact remains that his historical argument is very powerful. Those who wish to challenge it will confront a formidable task in
light of the volume and persuasiveness of the evidence he has amassed
in support of his position.
But, at the same time, Government by Judiciaryis far more than an
exercise in historical analysis. It is an impassioned argument on behalf
of a specific rule of constitutional interpretation as well. That argument
24. Berger's argument on the exclusion of the right to vote from the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment follows closely the argument to the same effect in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion
in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 593-608 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But see Van Alstyne,
The Fourteenth Amendment, the 'Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 33.
25. 332 U.S. 46, 92-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The standard refutation of Justice
Black's contention is Fairman, Does the FourteenthAmendment Incorporatethe Bill of Rhts? The
OriginalUnderstanding,2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Fairman].
26. Berger devotes a chapter to refuting the theory that incorporation of the Bill of Rights
was intended by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. BERGER, supranote 1, at 134-56. See
also Fairman, supranote 25, at 43-134.
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is the central focus of Part II of the book, and it is here that Berger's
contentions are most arresting-and most vulnerable. Thus, for the
present, let us accept provisionally Berger's claim that the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment supports conclusively a restrictive interpretation of the scope of its provisions. Let us also bypass the argument most
commonly employed by academicians to discredit efforts to resort to
the original intention of the framers: that because historical records are
"incomplete" or "inconclusive," legislative history can never be definitive.27 The more important question is the extent to which history, however clear, should control interpretation of the Constitution.
Berger's argument on constitutional interpretation is tightly syllogistic. If one accepts the premises, the conclusion is foreordained. It
may be summarized as follows:
First Premise- Wherever possible, provisions of the Constitution
are to be interpreted in accordance with the ascertainable intent of the
framers and the understanding of the ratifiers. The framers' intent is to
be respected and must be given preference over the language of the text
2
even if that language suggests a different meaning.
SecondPremise: If a court interprets a constitutional provision in a
manner contrary to the intent of the framers, it is engaging in the process of amendment, and the authority granted to the judiciary to interpret the Constitution does not include the power to amend that
document; "the judiciary was excluded from policymaking." 29 When a
court attempts to change the Constitution it is subverting the terms of
30
Article V, which specifies the only legitimate means of amendment.
Conclusion: Since the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment is ascertainable, courts are obliged to honor it. Because
the Supreme Court has failed to do so, its rulings affording protection
under the amendment in cases involving racial segregation, voting
rights, and civil liberties should neither be "countenance[d]" nor
27. See tenBroek, Use by the UnitedStates Supreme Court of Extrinsic4idsin Constitutional
Construction:Debates and Proceedingsof the Constitutionaland Ratifying Conventions, 26 CALi.
L. REv. 437, 451-54 (1938); Wofford, The Blinding zight: The Uses of History in Constitutional
Interpretation,31 U. CHI. L. REv. 502, 503-11 (1964).
28. See BERGER, supra note 1, at 363-72.
29. Seeid at300-11.
30. See id at 316-18. See U.S. CONST. art. V:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall

propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of
two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths ofthe several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress ....

ORIGINAL INTENT THEORY

Spring 1978]
3

"tolerate[d]." '
The first question that necessarily arises in examining this syllogism is the extent to which the rule that written instruments must be
interpreted in light of the intent of the framers should apply to constitutions as well as to contracts, wills, and statutes. Certainly no such rule
of interpretation is specified in the federal Constitution, and it is far
from clear that the framers of that document intended it to be construed in so rigid a manner, especially-in light of their deliberate use of
general language easily adaptable to changing circumstances in future
eras. Thus, if interpretation on the basis of original intention is to be
adopted as a fixed rule, a justification must be found for it. Berger
notes that "rules governing 'intention' reach far back in legal history,"
and that "English case-law emphasis on effectuation of the 'original
intention' was summarized in Bacon's Abridgment ..

."2 However,

the early common-law references relate principally to the interpretation
of documents drafted by private parties, such as contracts and wills. In
such instances, there is little question that, except in rare cases where
overriding considerations of public policy are implicated, the intention
of the private parties is what the legal machinery of the state should
enforce. The "original intent" rule is, however, also commonly utilized
as a doctrine of statutory interpretation, where its function is to underscore the responsibility of judges to interpret a law in order to effectuate, not frustrate, the aims of the enacting legislature. The classic early
statement of this doctrine appears in Heydon's Case,33 decided in 1584,
in which the English Court of Exchequer stated that statutes are to be
read "to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the
true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bonopublico.' 34 By 1930, Max
Radin was able to say that the number of American cases declaring the
primacy of the rule that statutes should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of their framers "run[s] into the hundreds. 35 But statutes are, by their very nature, ephemeral; the legislature may amend
them whenever it decides to alter the policy they embody or to extend
or restrict their reach. A constitution, on the other hand, is, in Chief
31. BERGER, supra note 1, at 417.
32. Id at 366. The reference is to M. BACON, A NEw ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (3d ed. 1768).
33. 3 Coke 7 (Exch. Ch. 1584).

34. Id. at 7b.
35. Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 870 n.14 (1930) [hereinafter cited
as Radin]. Radin, however, goes on to state that "courts in England and America have generally

qualified the 'golden rule' that intent governs the meaning of a statute, by saying that it must be
the intent 'as expressed in the statute.'" Id at 872.
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Justice Marshall's classic statement, "intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs."36 In view of that critical characteristic, it would not seem that
the original intent of the framers of a constitution should be accorded
the same controlling effect given to the intentions of those who enact a
statute. As generations pass, the precise end that the framers of a constitution sought to achieve may no longer be relevant, and it may be far
more desirable and sensible for courts to ignore outmoded intentions
and instead concern themselves with accommodating the spirit and
general goals of the provision under consideration. As Leonard Levy
has put it: "The principles themselves, not their framers'
understanding
37
and application of them, are meant to endure."

Berger, however, insists that the "original intent" rule should apply both to statutory and constitutional interpretation. As he demonstrates, there is no dearth of dicta by the Supreme Court that appear to
support that position, although there also exist dicta advocating a contrary view. 38 The fact that judicial assertions of the necessity for fidelity
to the original intent of the framers of the Constitution frequently appear reflects, perhaps, nothing more than an instinctive mechanism of
self-protection against those who may object to a particular line of constitutional interpretation. It does not demonstrate the existence of a
constitutional rule inexorably requiring adherence to the original intent
of the framers, and such dicta seem no more entitled to deference than
do other judicial protestations of adherence to the procedures of
mechanical jurisprudence. But Berger relies on these assertions, and
36. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis in original). Elsewhere, the Court has declared that constitutions "are not ephemeral enactments." Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). See note 85 infra.
37. L. LEvY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 17 (1972).
38. Jacobus tenBroek, in his study of the Supreme Court's use of historical materials in
constitutional adjudication, concluded that: "Whenever the United States Supreme Court has felt
itself called ,upon to announce a theory for its conduct in the matter of constitutional interpretation, it has insisted, with almost uninterrupted regularity, that the end and object of constitutional
construction is the discovery of the intention of those persons who formulated the instrument or of
the people who adopted it." TenBroek, Use by the UnitedStates Supreme CourtofExtrinsicAids in
ConstitutionalConstruction- The Intent Theory of ConstitutionalConstruction,27 CALIF. L. REv.
399, 399 (1939) [hereinafter cited as tenBroek]. TenBroek, however, hastened to add that this
theory "is an utterly false portrayal of what the Supreme Court actually does," that "the pretense
of a disinterested search for the original intent is judicial hokum," and, moreover, that the "theory
is also a misrepresentation of what the Court ought to do," since "exclusive concentration on the
condition of things at the time of the framing would tend to cast modem constructions in the mold
of a factual world that has been superseded." Id at 410. The best known of the contrary dicta are
probably those in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,433 (1920), and in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934); see note 56 and accompanying text infra. See also
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910); see note 85 infra.
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since on this point a dictum by Chief Justice John Marshall is appar-

ently worth two by anyone else, he principally stresses the well-known
passage in Chief Justice Marshall's dissent in Ogden v. Saunder, 39 in

which he stated that the words of the Constitution should not be "extended to objects not . . . contemplated by its framers." 4 To hold
otherwise, Berger asserts, "is to convert the 'chains of the Constitution'
4

to ropes of sand." '
This "original intent" theory of constitutional interpretation was
long ago subjected to devastatingly effective criticism by Jacobus tenBroek and Charles P. Curtis, among others,4 2 and one would have

thought that their critiques had caused it to be interred once and for all.
However, because it has now been advocated again by a scholar of the
stature of Raoul Berger, an exhumation and reexamination seem in order. And, "[i]n considering this question," Chief Justice Marshall continues to remind us, "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we
are expounding.

43

To illuminate the problem, it would be helpful to look at what are
probably the two best known cases in which the question of the binding
effect of the original intent of the framers of the Constitution has been
squarely addressed-two cases which point in opposite directions. The
first of these decisions is Dred Scott v. Sandford.' The jurisdictional

issue in that case was whether free blacks were "citizens" within the
meaning of Article III of the Constitution, so that they could bring suit
39. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
40. Id.at 332 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). The full quotation of Chief Justice Marshall's
words is:
Much, too, has been said concerning the principles of construction which ought to
be applied to the constitution of the United States.
On this subject, also, the Court has taken such frequent occasion to declare its opinion, as to make it unnecessary, at least, to enter again into an elaborate discussion of it.
To say that the intention of the instrument must prevail; that this intention must be
collected from its words; that its words are to be understood in that sense in which they
are generally used by those for whom the instrument was intended; that its provisions are
neither to be restricted into insignificance, nor extended to objects not comprehended in
them, nor contemplated by its framers;-is to repeat what has been already said more at
large, and is all that can be necessary.
Id
41. BERGER, supranote I, at 371 (quoting a statement by Thomas Jefferson appearing in the
Kentucky Resolution of 1798, reprintedin 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 543 (J. Elliot ed. 1836)).
42. C. CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 1-8 (1947); tenBroek, supra note 38.
43. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original).
44. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). It is interesting that, despite Berger's exhaustive quotation
from judicial and scholarly writings on the essentiality of respect for the original intent of the
framers, he never cites Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scot14 although there is no judicial
utterance that more directly or forcefully states the case for his position.
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in federal court under the diversity clause.45 Chief Justice Taney,
speaking for the majority, declared that blacks
are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the
word "citizens" in the Constitution. . . .On the contrary, they were
at that time [of the adoption of the Constitution] considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by
the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained
subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as
those 4who
held the power and the Government might choose to grant
6
them.

Although the Chief Justice acknowledged that public opinion may
have changed, that free blacks may have come to be regarded as citizens, and that they may have been granted the rights and privileges of
citizenship in many states, he asserted that the Court was powerless to
recognize this attitudinal change because the word "citizens" could not,
in 1857, be read to include those persons who were not contemplated as
being citizens by the framers in 1787:47
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized
nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give
to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their
favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was
framed and adopted. Such an argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to interpret it. If any of its provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument
itself by which it may be amended; but while it remains unaltered, it
must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption. It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and
delegates the same powers to the Government, and reserves and
secures the same rights and privileges to the citizen; and as long as it
continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same
words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke
when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and
adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and
45. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2: "The judicial Power shall extend .
between Citizens of different States...

.

to Controversies...

46. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-05.
47. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Curtis challenged the Chief Justice's view that free
blacks were not considered citizens by the states at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
and demonstrated by examination ofjudicial decisions of the period and state constitutional provisions that free blacks were then accorded the status of citizens in North Carolina, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, and New Jersey. Id. at 571-75 (Curtis, J., dissenting). His evidence
seems to show that Chief Justice Taney's postion was not soundly based, but, in light of Berger's
thesis, the relevant question is not whether the Chief Justice's historical assertions were correct,
but whether, on the assumption that they were correct, the Court was obliged to declare in 1857
that free blacks were not citizens within the meaning of the Constitution.
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make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.

This court was not created by the Constitution for such purposes.
Higher and graver trusts have been confided to it, and it must not
falter in the path of duty.a s

It is difficult to imagine a more unsuitable rule for the interpretation of the Constitution. Even assuming the validity of Chief Justice

Taney's view of the intent of the framers with regard to the word "citizens," why should the meaning of that word not be allowed to change

with the passage of time so that all persons who, in a different generation, are looked upon as citizens can be considered as being included
within the scope of the word? Since the Constitution in 1787 contained
no definition of citizenship, how would such an interpretation convert
its "chains" to "ropes of sand"? 49 How would such an intrepretation
50
undermine the "security for a consistent and stable [government]"?
The second illustrative case is Home Building & Loan Association
v. Blaisdell,5 1 decided in 1934. In the midst of the Depression, Minnesota adopted legislation providing that courts could, if they deemed it
"just and equitable," extend the period of redemption with respect to
mortgage foreclosures, so long as the duration of such an extension did
not continue beyond May 1, 1935.52 As the historical evidence collected
in Justice Sutherland's dissenting opinion made abundantly clear, the
central purpose of the contract clause of article one, section ten of the
Constitution 53 was to forbid debtor relief legislation, specifically including stay laws and mortgage moratoria. 4 However, the majority,
48. Id at 426 (majority opinion).
49. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
50. BERGER, supra note I, at 3,364 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June
25, 1824), reprintedin9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MA.DISON 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1910)). The principal part of the quotation used by Berger is:
I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the Constitution was
accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution.
And if that be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no security for a consistent
and stable [government?], more than for a faithful exercise of its powers.
51. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). An excellent discussion of this decision may be found in C. MILLER,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 39-51 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MILLER].

52. 1933 Minn. Sess. Laws ch. 339, pt. 1, § 4.
53. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1: "No State shall... pass any. . . Law impairing the
"
Obligation of contracts ....
54. 290 U.S. at 453-65 (Sutherland, J., dissenting, joined by Butler, McReynolds & Van Devanter, JJ.). Cf.C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 5-6 (1928) (noting that among
the principal reasons leading to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was dissatisfaction with
such prevalent state actions as those "staying process of the Courts, making property a tender in
payment of debts, issuing paper money, interfering with foreclosure of mortgages.") Charles
Miller states that: "The history surrounding the inclusion of the contract clause in the Constitution
is clear, particularly with respect to debtor legislation of the type at issue in Blaisdell.That history
is unequivocally opposed to the decision of the Court." MILLER, supra note 51, at 43.
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consisting of Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo, declined to be bound by the evidence of the framers'
intent. As Charles Miller has noted,
[T]he opinion for the Court is unusual in that it does not invoke any
of the common responses that have been developed in constitutional
law to deal with obstinate historical facts. The first of these responses
is to devise a different interpretation of history that would permit a
different outcome for the case. A second is to dispute the clarity of
the historical facts and to hold, on that basis, that history is of no real
aid in settling the issue. A third response is to ignore history altogether. But Chief Justice Hughes admits that history is not on his side
and proceeds to decide the case on other principles. 55
Instead of invoking these common responses, the Chief Justice
declared:
It is manifest. . . that there has been a growing appreciation of
public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a rational
compromise between individual rights and public welfare. The settlement and consequent contraction of the public domain, the pressure
of a constantly increasing density of population, the interrelation of
the activities of our people and the complexity of our economic interests, have inevitably led to an increased use of the organization of
society in order to protect the very bases of individual opportunity.
Where, in earlier days, it was thought that only the concerns of individuals or of classes were involved, and that those of the State itself
were touched only remotely, it has later been found that the fundamental interests of the State are directly affected; and that the question is no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against
another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of all depends.
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended
a century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution
meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time.
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its
adoption it means today, it is intended to say that the great clauses of
the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the
framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would
5 6 have
placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation.
55. MILLER, supra note 51, at 43.

56. 290 U.S. at 442-43. The opinion goes on to cite, in support of its position, the statements
regarding the nature of a constitution in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819), see notes 36, 43 and accompanying text supra, and
in Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920):
When we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of
the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development
of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. ... The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and
not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.
Berger discusses both McCulloch v. Maryland and Missouri v. Hollang and denies that either
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In other words, where a constitutional provision written in 1787 for an
agrarian society that was largely individualistic in its economic structure must be applied nearly 150 years later in a society that has become
urbanized,-industrialized, and highly interdependent, it is unfeasible to
insist that the intention of the framers be strictly observed, particularly
when the impact of such an observance would be far different from
that which they could have imagined, and might be catastrophic.
Needless to say, the dissent of Justice Sutherland in Blaisdell advanced Berger's argument for rigid adherence to the framers' original
intent 57 in as vigorous a fashion as had Chief Justice Taney's opinion in
DredScott. Assuming, arguendo, that the view of history presented by
these two justices is accurate, does it follow that DredScott was rightly
decided and Blaisdell wrongly? Most students of constitutional law
would shrink from drawing such a conclusion. The practical effect of
accepting such a view is that if, as Chief Justice Taney claimed, the
Constitution was conceived in a spirit of racism, we must either amend
it or continue to read and apply it as a racist document, even if its
words, such as "citizens," be perfectly neutral. Similarly, it would mean
that if, as Charles Beard has argued, 58 the Constitution was written by
men who wished, above all, to protect the interests of the propertied
class, we must either amend it or continue to read and apply it as disfavoring the poor and disadvantaged, even if the language of the document does not require such an interpretation. There seems something
radically wrong with a theory of constitutional construction that would
demand such results, and, as Justice Edward Douglass White once
wrote: "the natural reluctance of the mind to follow an erroneous principle to its necessary conclusion, and thus to give effect to a grievous
wrong arising from the erroneous principle, is an admonition that the
constitutes a valid argument for departing from the framers' original intent. See BERGER, supra
note 1,at 373-84.
57. 290 U.S. at 448-53. Justice Sutherland speaks of the changelessness of the Constitution,
quoting the passage from Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,
426 (1857), see note 48 and accompanying text supra.Berger feels constrained to comment on the
fact that he and Justice Sutherland are on the same side on this question:
Small as is my esteem of Justice Sutherland, I consider nevertheless that his dissent has a
firmer historical base. My friends inquire whether I am not troubled to find myself in
such company. Edmund Wilson called this "the 'bedfellow' line of argument, which relies on producing the illusion of having put you irremediably in the wrong by associating
you with some odious person who holds a similar opinion." E. Wilson, Europe Without a
Baedeker 154 (1966). To which I would add, "I would rather be right with my enemy
than wrong with my friend."
BERGER, supranote I, at 374 n.6. He does not indicate his reaction to being opposed to those like
Justice Brandeis. See notes 146-148 and accompanying text infra.
58. C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1913).
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principle itself is wrong."59
For Berger, however, the fact that his principle of constitutional
interpretation might have harsh results is of little consequence. He rejects the notion that the "demands of justice

. . .

must rise above the

law,"60

and firmly maintains that courts "were not authorized to revise
the Constitution in the interests of 'justice.' "61 Courts are only empowered to apply the law, not to revise it, and "[r]espect for the limits on
power are [sic] the essence of a democratic society; without it the entire
democratic structure is undermined and the way is paved from Weimar
to Hitler."62 This type of hyperbole repeatedly mars Berger's argument.
It is difficult to see the seeds of the transition "from Weimar to Hitler"
in Chief Justice Hughes's opinion in the Blaisdell case, or in Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education,63 which is, for
Berger, the crowning example of the Supreme Court's disrespect for the
limits on judicial power.'
It is generally possible to distinguish between sincere efforts to
achieve justice and disingenuous attempts to rationalize corruption; if
such a distinction could not be made, there would be no effective way
of evaluating law except by majority vote-a process that may, under
certain circumstances, be precisely the means for paving the way from
Weimar to Hitler. There can be no doubt that the lessons of the halfcentury from 1887 to 1937 teach that there may be great costs in a system of law in which judges feel free to disregard the intent of the framers of the Constitution and to rely instead on their own views of what
the Constitution ought to say, and Berger has learned those lessons
well. But, as decisions like Dred Scott demonstrate, there may also be
great costs in a system of law in which judges mindlessly apply the
putative intention of the architects of the Constitution without regard
for the injustices they may thereby be perpetuating. Yet, in Berger's
view, nothing less than the rule of law is at stake, and, like Justice Robert Jackson, he rests his case on the proposition that " 'the rule of law is
in unsafe hands when courts cease to function as courts and become
organs for control of policy.' 65

59. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 372 (1904) (White, J., dissenting).
60. BERGER, supra note 1, at 288.
61. Id. at 288-89.
62. Id. at 410.
63. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
64. BERGER, supra note 1, at 117-33.
65. BERGER, supra note 1, at 298 (quoting R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SuPREMACy 322 (1941) [hereinafter cited as JACKSON]).
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The overriding concern of Berger's book is to ensure the exclusion
of the courts from the policymaking process. However, a major problem with the book is the lack of congruence between this concern and
the "original intent" rule of constitutional construction. In the first
place, the rule would do far more than limit judicialpower; it would
also deny the authority of Congress, as the legitimate policymaking
branch, to make an ambiguous grant of power serve an imperative national need. Thus, if it was not the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid racial segregation or racial discrimination
except with respect to those areas enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of
1866, strict observance of the "original intent" rule would mean that an
act of Congress, passed pursuant to section five of the amendment, that
sought to enforce the equal protection clause by forbidding even statemandated segregation, would be unconstitutional. Under Berger's conception of judicial review, the Supreme Court could not passively uphold that law by deferriig to the judgment of Congress. On the
contrary, it would be the responsibility of the Court to declare such a
law invalid because of its inconsistency with the original intent of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, since it is obviously
possible for courts to find a spurious "original intent," Berger's rule of
interpretation would allow judges to interpolate their own policies into
the Constitution by first interpolating them into the intentions of the
framers. Indeed, that is exactly how the Supreme Court has often used
the "original intent" rule.66 Ironically, therefore, Berger's rule has the
potential to become a vehicle for the expansion, not the contraction, of
judicial power.
Furthermore, Berger's reliance on adherence to the rule of law67 as
the basic premise of the argument against constitutional change
through judicial reinterpretation begs a fundamental question. It does
no violence to the rule of law to change existing laws. If the Supreme
Court may legitimately construe the Fourteenth Amendment as
prohibiting racial segregation, even if that prohibition was not within
the original intent of the framers, then such a construction itself becomes the law and is entitled to respect under the rule of law. The rule
is violated only if the procedure by which the change is made is illegitimate. But expansive construction of a constitutional provision by the
courts can only be rejected as illegitimate if it is first determined that
66. See generally MILLER, supra note 51; tenBroek, supra note 38.
67. This rule endeavors "to make certain that men in power would be governed by law, not

the arbitrary fiat of the man or men in power." In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 384 (1970) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original). See BERGER, supra note 1, at 288-89.
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all judicial interpretation of the Constitution in a manner at variance
with the ascertainable original intent of the framers is impermissible
regardless of both the enormous societal changes that may have taken
place since the framers spoke and the fact that the interpretation may
be entirely consistent with the actual language that the framers utilized
in drafting the constitutional provision in question. If such judicial interpretation is not inherently impermissible, then there is no illegitimacy in the procedure by which the law is changed, and thus no
deviation from the rule of law. There is, therefore, a degree of circularity in Berger's argument. Judicial interpretation of the Constitution
that is inconsistent with the precise intentions of the framers is intolerable because it violates the rule of law, and it violates the rule of law
because it is inconsistent with the intent of the framers.
In the final analysis, Berger asks us to accept the harsh consequences of fidelity to the original intent for two reasons: (1) to insure
total judicial exclusion from policymaking, and (2) to safeguard the integrity of Article V of the Constitution,68 which sets down what Berger
sees as the only valid mechanism for effecting any change in that document. As has been observed, the first of these reasons suffers from two
defects: it is unduly absolutist, in that it would forbid alljudicial policymaking without regard to any possible justification, and it is overbroad, in that it would forbid more than simply judicialpolicymaking.
The second reason seems equally dubious.
With regard to Article V, Berger, like Justice Black,6 9 holds that if
the originally intended meanings of individual provisions of the Constitution are now considered obsolete and no longer adequate or appropriate for modem needs or conditions, the Constitution specifies the
only remedy-the formal amendment process. By creating "a written
Constitution, and expressly providing for change by amendment," Berger writes, the framers "evidenced that they had created a 'fixed' Constitution, subject to change by that process alone."7 Similarly, he adds,
"Article V constitutes the exclusive medium of change, under the longstanding maxim that to name a particular mode is to exclude all
others."71 It is more than a little surprising to find one of the ancient
canons of statutory construction put forward as an authoritative guide
to constitutional interpretation, since it would be difficult today to find
1

68. U.S. CONST. art. V. See note 30 supra.
69. See, e.g., H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FArTH 21 (1968); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
70. BERGER, supra note I, at 291.
71. Id. at 318 (emphasis in original).
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any judge or commentator who would be prepared to treat them as
binding.72 But, aside from that, is it true that every manner of constitutional change is one that would call for invocation of the procedure set
forth in Article V? Although Berger would give an affirmative answer
to this question, the soundness of that answer is not readily apparent.
"[N]othing but disaster," Alexander Bickel has written, "could result
for government under a written constitution if it were generally accepted that the specific intent of the framers of a constitutional provibinding, subject
sion is ascertainable and is forever and specifically
73
amendment.
of
process
only to the cumbersome
If a desired change would be unmistakably contrary to an unambiguous provision of the Constitution, there is no doubt that the only
legitimate mode of accomplishing it would be by formal amendment.
Thus, if the populace desires to reduce the minimum age of eligibility
to serve as President from thirty-five to thirty,74 or to allow for reduction of the salaries of federal judges through means other than taxation
or failure to grant increases to match the cost of living, 75 a constitutional amendment would clearly be necessary. On the other hand, it
has been established, af least through acquiescence, that departures
from the original conceptions of the framers may come about without
any change in the constitutional text. The transmogrification of the
electoral college from a body of impartial men to a group selected on
behalf of a political party in each state and pledged to vote for the
candidates for President and Vice President of that party is surely a
constitutional change without amendment.
72.

See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TaA TsON: DECIDING APPEALS 521-35

(1960), where many of the most common canons of construction are listed alongside judicial statements antithetical to each. Justice Felix Frankfurter has written that these canons cannot "save us
from the anguish ofjudgment. Such canons give an air of abstract intellectual compulsion to what
is in fact a delicate judgment." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 527, 544 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Frankfurter]. Of the particular canon Berger
invokes, expresslo unius est exclusio alterus,Max Radin has written that it "is in direct contradic-

tion to the habits of speech of most persons," adding that: "So far from being logical, as some
courts have called it, it illustrates one of the most fatuously simple of logical fallacies, the 'illicit
major,' long the pons asinorum of schoolboys." Radin, supra note 35, at 873-74. In a critical note
to Radin's article, James M. Landis, arguing for judicial attention to, and respect for, legislative

intent in the interpretation of statutes, admits that this canon is "despised," but suggests that it is
not without utility if used circumspectly. Speaking of such canons, he concludes: "Like most 'rules

of law,' they solve only the obvious case, and give direction for profitable thinking about the
difficult ones. And it is true of them, as of most 'rules of law,' that occasions will arise when they
must be broken." Landis, .4 Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HAzv. L. REV. 886, 892-93

(1930).
73. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 106.
74. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1,para. 5.
75. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I, para. 1.
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Change through extraconstitutional evolution is related to, but distinct from, a common form of constitutional growth that is not properly
described as change at all, viz., where general words in the Constitution
are applied to new developments that could not have been foreseen by
the framers but are within the categories that they established. Thus,
the expansion of the word "commerce" to include modes of transportation and communication totally unknown to and probably never anticipated by the framers is not, in any real sense, a constitutional change.
The framers did not intend to exclude future modes of transit from the
coverage of the Constitution, and, when those modes developed, they
fell within the category of "commerce," which, as defined by John
Marshall, included "commercial intercourse.

. .

in all its branches."76

Any claim, therefore, that Berger's argument would necessitate a formal amendment to allow Congress to regulate automobile, rail, or air
travel, or telephone, telegraph, radio, or television is wide of the mark.
It would not. Justice Sutherland, who presaged Berger's argument forty
years earlier in his dissent in Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell,77 was careful to draw this distinction. Citing the appropriateness of the expansion of the commerce clause to cover modem technological developments, he noted: "The provisions of the Federal
Constitution, undoubtedly, are pliable in the sense that in appropriate
cases they have the capacity of bringing within their grasp every new
condition which falls within their meaning. But, their meaning is
changeless; it is only their applicationwhich is extensible.""8
More problematical are changes that are not unmistakably contrary to a constitutional provision, but which require a strained reading
of the words of that provision. If the strained reading is more consistent
with the intent of the framers than the words they actually employed,
Berger would applaud the interpretation, deny that any change was involved, and reject the need for formal amendment,7 9 thereby giving
actual application to Justice Frankfurter's quip "that only when legisla76. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824) (emphasis added).
77. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See notes 51-57 and accompanying text supra.
78. Id. at 451 (Sutherland, J., dissenting, joined by Butler, McReynolds & VanDevanter, JJ.)
(emphasis in original). But cf.tenBroek, supra note 38, at 413-18, in which it is powerfully argued

that the distinction between the meaning and the application of a constitutional provision is a
fiction. "The meaning of terms cannot be changeless if their application is extensible because their

meaning is not only determined by, but is the extent of their application." Id. at 416.
79. Berger states: "On traditional canons of interpretation, the intention of the framers being

unmistakably expressed, that intention is as good as written into the text."

BERGER,

supra note I,

at 7 (citing Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903): "A thing may be within the letter of a

statute and not within its meaning, and within its meaning though not within its letter. The intention of the lawmaker is the law.").
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tive history is doubtful do you go to the statute."' 0 Under Berger's approach, therefore, whether the Court was justified in reading the
Fourth Amendment l as a guarantee against the practice of indiscriminate warrantless wiretapping,82 despite the fact that this practice involves no physical search or invasion of any "persons, houses, papers,
[or] effects" and no seizure of any tangible items, would depend on
whether the framers meant only to provide constitutional protection
against the specific transgressions mentioned, as Justice Black argued, 3
or instead meant to provide a broad safeguard against improper police
surveillance by whatever techniques technology might make available.
But to focus on this question is to ignore that, in 1791, the framers
could not have imagined how much more destructive of personal security wiretaps could be than general warrants or writs of assistance. Paying exclusive attention to their intent would omit from judicial
consideration not only all modern knowledge of the efficacy of existing
or potential systems of surveillance, but also all consideration of the
values that we assign to individual privacy and dignity, on the one
hand, and, on the other hand, the importance that electronic eavesdropping may have in the detection of reprehensible crimes that might
otherwise remain unsolved. If these considerations must be deemed irrelevant, the Constitution would be a sterile document, indeed. Certainly Justice Brandeis was not prepared to disregard these
considerations when the wiretapping issue first came to the Supreme
Court, and, in his classic dissent in Olmstead v. United States,8 4 he
called for an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in light of modem needs, not historical evidence.8 5
80. Frankfurter, supra note 72, at 543.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
82. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).

83. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 365-67 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 71-77 (1967) (Black, J.,dissenting).
84. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).
85. In the course of his dissent, Justice Brandeis quoted the following passage from Justice
McKenna's opinion for the Court in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910):

Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience of

evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form
that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new condi-

tions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They

are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the
words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly as human

institutions can approach it." The future is their care and provision for events of good

and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitu-

tion, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.
Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be
deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value and be
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Also in the category of cases involving a strained reading of the
text of a constitutional provision is Home Building & Loan Association
v. Blaisdell.8 6 The language of article one, section ten, forbidding any
state from passing a "law impairing the obligation of Contracts"87 is
not so unambiguous that the Minnesota mortgage moratorium law
could be said unmistakably to contravene it. Nevertheless, a strained
reading of the contract clause is certainly required in order to sustain
the state legislation. Moreover, this strained reading, whatever its appropriateness in the context of the Great Depression, cannot honestly
be justified by the claim that it comports with the intent of the framers.
Blaisdelldemonstrates that there may be compelling reasons for a
judicial reluctance to be bound by the intent of the framers even when
a deviation from that intent requires a conscious distortion of the actual
words of the Constitution. If that is true, the reluctance must be all the
more compelling where the deviation from the framers' intent requires
no modfi'cation whatever of the constitutional text. Thus, in framing the
Fourteenth Amendment, the members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
wrote that "No State shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.""8 This is a broad guarantee of
equality, but Berger insists that, despite its comprehensive language, it
must be read to guarantee equality only with regard to the specific
rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,9 because these were
the only rights the framers sought to protect.90 Indeed, Berger presents
convincing evidence that the Thirty-Ninth Congress had a narrow purpose, and meant to protect neither political equality by guarafteeing
the right to vote nor social equality by prohibiting the segregation of
the races. Yet even if one concedes that the members of Congress were
concerned only with providing protection for a few narrowly defined
rights, the question remains as to why they wrote into the Constitution
the expansive language of the equal protection clause rather than specifically identifying the rights that they sought to guarantee. To this
question, Berger has only one answer, which he offers twice. He first
writes:
converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words

might be lost m reality.
Id. at 373, quoted in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-73 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
86. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See notes 51-56 and accompanying text surra.
87. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, ci. 1.

88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See note 18 supra.
89. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
90. BERGER, supra note 1, at 99-116, 166-92.
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[There is] all but universal identification of § 1 [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] with the Civil Rights Act. Why, then, were not the
terms of the Act incorporated bodily in § 1? Constitutional drafting
calls for the utmost compression, avoidance of the prolixity of a code;
"the specific and exclusive enumeration of rights in the Act," as
Bickel remarked, presumably
was considered "inappropriate in a
91
constitutional provision."

Subsequently, he states: "A Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall stated,
cannot have the 'prolixity of a code'; there the drive is for the most
92
compressed utterance."
But avoidance of prolixity is not an end in itself. If the framers of a
constitutional provision wish it to be read narrowly by future courts,
they are free to be as specific as necessary in order to insure that end.
91. Id at 39 (citing Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARv. L. Rav. 1, 61 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Bickel]). It is worth noting that, immediately

following the language quoted by Berger, Bickel went on to write:
These bits and pieces of additional evidence do not contradict and could not in any
event override the direct proof showin& the specific evils at which the great body of
congressional opinion thought it was striking. But perhaps they provide sufficient basis
for the formulation of an additional hypothesis. It remains true that an explicit provision
going further than the Civil Rights Act could not have been carried in the 39th Congress;
also that a plenary grant of legislative power such as the Bingham amendment would not
have mustered the necessary majority. But may it not be that the Moderates and the
Radicals reached a compromise permitting them to go to the country with language
which they could, where necessary, defend against damaging alarms raised by the opposition, but which at the same time was sufficiently elastic to permit reasonable future
advances?. . . It had both sweep and the appearance of a careful enumeration of rights,
and it had a ring to echo in the national memory of libertarian beginnings. To put it
another way, the Moderates. . . could go forth and honestly defend themselves against
charges that on the day after ratification, Negroes were going to become white men's
"social equals," marry their daughters, vote in their elections, sit on their juries, and
attend schools with their children. . . . In the future, the Radicals could, in one way or
another, put through such further civil rights provisions as they thought the country
would tale, without being subject to the sort of effective constitutional objections which
haunted them when they were forced to operate under the thirteenth amendment.
.. . [N]o specific purpose going beyond the coverage of the Civil Rights Act is
suggested; rather an awareness on the part of these framers that it was a constitutionthey
were writing, which led to the choice of language capable of growth.
Bickel, supra, at 61-63. Berger subjects Bickel's hypothesis to lengthy attack and rejects the "speculation that there was an unrevealed purpose to confer broader powers in the future." BERGER,
supra note 1, at 110. But surely the members of Congress must have seen that the language they
were using in the amendment was an open invitation to such speculation, and that, as long as
there was room for speculation, the possibility existed that a broader interpretation would be
given to the words of the amendment in the future.
92. BERGER, supranote 1, at 110. The full quotation from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819), is:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great
powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution,
would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the
human mind. It wouldprobably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore,
requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated,
andthe minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of
the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American
constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the
language.
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The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment obviously understood this,
for the provisions of sections two, three, and four of the amendment are
quite specific and detailed, and do partake of the "prolixity of a legal
code." If these men wanted to make sure that section one was applied
by future generations only to protect the rights enumerated in the Civil
Rights Act, it would have taken only a few additional lines to do so,
and their intent would have been made plain.93 Thus, the significance
of their deliberate failure to take this simple course cannot be overlooked; the omission strongly suggests that they desired a constitutional
provision that would be adaptable to future exigencies. To recall the
words of Max Radin, "the legislature can not both have its cake and eat
it. It can not indulge itself in using large, round, sonorous words and
then complain that courts do not treat them as precise, definite, and
unreverberant." 94

Avoidance of prolixity serves not to insure that the Constitution is
short, as Berger seems to believe, but rather to insure that it is flexible.
Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.Maryland95 speaks of "a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs," 96 and adds that for the
framers to have inserted detailed provisions "would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if
foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur." 97 No other explanation of the use of "large,

round, sonorous words" makes sense. Berger attempts to discredit
Chief Justice Marshall's argument in McCulloch by describing it as "a
self-serving claim of power to amend the Constitution,"9 " and arguing
that the Chief Justice himself firmly repudiated any such implication in
his pseudonymous defense of the McCulloch decision recently discovered by Professor Gerald Gunther. 99 However, Berger's use of the term
"self-serving" to describe the McCulloch opinion, rather than Chief
Justice Marshall's defense of it, is puzzling. Certainly, if one's writings
are attacked by powerful political foes who denounce them as an as93. Alfred Kelly found the framers' choice of broad language for § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to be particularly significant. See Kelly, supra note 14, at 1071-86. Berger examines
and rejects Kelly's suggestion, concluding that "there is no evidence of a concealed purpose" to
include more comprehensive protection in the Fourteenth Amendment than in the Civil Rights
Act. BERGER, supra note 1, at 112.
94. Radin, supra note 35, at 884.
95. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
96. Id. at 415 (emphasis in original).
97. Id.
98. BERGER, supra note 1, at 375.
99. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (G. Gunther ed. 1969).
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sault upon the emotion-laden principle of states' rights, to defend them
by denying that they constitute such a threat is clearly self-serving.
And, because Berger means to suggest by the use of that adjective that
McCulloch was an assertion of judicial"power to amend the Constitution," it is necessary to emphasize that the significance of Chief Justice

Marshall's dicta is not that they permit expansion of federal judicial
power, but that they provide the groundwork for the enormously broad
development of congressionalpower that has since occurred. If anything, McCulloch is an abnegation of judicial authority to limit the
powers of Congress, and its critics recognized it as such.1°°

To permit courts to construe constitutional provisions in a manner
not specifically intended by the framers themselves concededly accords
the judiciary some degree of policymaking power. Admittedly, power,
once conceded, is open to abuse, and such abuses must be guarded
against. Indeed, a very cogent argument can be made that both the
Warren and Burger Courts have often extended their authority to give

meaning to the Constitution past the point that is compatible with a
proper role for the judicial branch in a democratic society. 01 Therefore, efforts to find and describe limits to the proper scope of judicial
100. See, e.g., C. WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 19394 (1935):
Present-day o ponents of the Court center their dissatisfaction on those decisions of the
Court which have held Acts of Congress invalid It must be remembered, however, that
for the first seventy-five years of the Court's existence, the attacks made upon it by its
opponents were due to its decisions holding Acts of Congress valid, and it was because
the Court upheld Congress in passing statutes, deemed by numbers of the people to
violate the rights of individuals and of the States, that the Court was subjected for so
many years to savage antagonism by considerable classes and sections of the country.
For seventy-five years, it was the encroachments by Congress, supported by the Court,
that were feared-and not at all encroachments by the Court in derogation of Congressional power.
(Emphasis in original.)
101. For cases that may exemplify judicial adoption of such an incompatible role, see, e.g.,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Court assumed the authority to decide whether the national
interest in avoiding corruption in presidential elections will allow limitations to be placed on expenditures in election campaigns on behalf of the candidates of the major political parties even
though the political process is available to correct legislative excesses significantly burdening the
ability of either party to advocate the candidacy of its nominees); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (Court evinced a willingness to draw lines establishing the precise times during the period
of a woman's pregnancy when the state's interest in her health and in the potential life of the fetus
override the constitutional right to terminate that pregnancy that was found by the justices to be
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394
U.S. 526 (1969) (Court insisted that U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, as interpreted by prior decisions,
requires a state to seek to achieve precise mathematical equality in congressional districting
plans); Malloy v. Hogan, 387 U.S. 1 (1964) (Court indicated that the Bill of Rights applies to the
states exactly as it does to the federal government, regardless of whether all aspects of the incorporated provisions are essential to fundamental fairness).
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policymaking would be entirely appropriate.10 2 But that is not the purpose of Berger's book. He does not attack alleged abuses of judicial
policymaking; rather, he objects to all such policymaking, and thus
puts himself in opposition to decisions that are plainly among the
greatest in American constitutional history, and which few persons
would wish to see reversed."13
But why is it not sufficient, as Berger asserts, to rely on the amending process to remedy all perceived constitutional defects? In the first
place, if all that needs to be amended is the original intention of the
framers, it would be difficult to know how to amend the document. If
Chief Justice Taney was correct in Dred Scott v. SandfordM that the
word "citizens" in Article III was intended to encompass only whites,
the flaw is not in the word itself, but in the artificially restrictive meaning that the framers gave it. If the term "equal protection of the laws"
does not apply to state laws imposing social inequalities or discrimination with regard to voting, new words are not what is needed to correct
the deficiency. As Alexander Bickel has correctly noted, "equal protection of the laws [is] a clause which is plainly capable of being applied to
all subjects of state legislation."'0 5 Should Congress be obliged to propose to the states for ratification a constitutional amendment identical
in language to an existing provision merely to provide the judiciary
with evidence of a different intent?
In the second place, as has already been noted, 10 6 the "original
intent" rule was developed initially as a rule of interpretation of documents far different from constitutions. If, as the Supreme Court has
soundly observed, constitutions are not "ephemeral enactments,
designed to meet passing occasions,"' 07 there would seem to be every
reason to avoid mindless transfer to the area of constitutional interpre102. The best effort to do so is still Justice Stone's footnote in United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, PILLAR OF
THE LAW 511-16 (1956).
103. Even Berger would now be unwilling to go back to what he sees as the original intention of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and rule that racial segregation is not forbidden

by the Constitution. He writes: "It would, however, be utterly unrealistic and probably impossible
to undo the past in the face of the expectations that the segregation decisions, for example, have
aroused in our black citizenry--expectations confirmed by every decent instinct. That is more
than the courts should undertake and more, I believe, than the American people would desire."
BEgrER, supra note 1, at 412-13. Yet he admits that had he been on the Court when these cases
first arrived, he "should have felt constrained to hold that the relief sought lay outside the confines
of the judicial power." Id. at 412.
104. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
105. Bickel, supra note 91, at 60-61.
106. See notes 32-35 and accompanying text supra.
107. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). See note 85 kupra.
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tation of a rule that is justified in the context of statutory construction
by the overriding fact that if the legislature finds its previous intent to
be inadequate, it can alter it by the simple expedient of passing a new
law. No one expects a statute to endure for ages to come.
Third, while Berger recognizes that a constitution "cannot have
'the prolixity of a [legal] code,' "108 his rule would result, at best, in a
Constitution that is exceedingly prolix. If every desired deviation from
the original intention of the framers were to necessitate a constitutional
amendment, the number of amendments that would have become necessary in the past 190 years (sometimes to change meanings without
changing words) would be extraordinarily large or else the Constitution
would have come to be looked upon as an intolerable barrier to sound
government. As Edward Levi has so clearly observed:
It may be suggested that the doctrine should be otherwise; that
as with legislation so with a constitution, the interpretation ought to
remain fixed in order to permit the people through legislative machinery, such as the constitutional convention or the amending process, to make a change. But the answer lies not only in the difficulties
of obtaining an amendment, nor the difficult position of a court
which obdurately refuses to interpret common words in a way ordinary citizens believe to be proper. The more complete answer is that
a written constitution must be enormously ambiguous in its general
provisions. If there has been an incorrect interpretation of the words,
an amendment would come close to repeating the same words. What
is desired is a different emphasis, not different language. This is tantamount to saying that what is required is a different interpretation
rather than an amendment. 0 9
Although Berger scorns those who believe that it is one of the tasks
of the federal courts to insure that the Constitution is not substantially
at variance with broadly held conceptions of justice, 1 0 the maintenance of a constitutional system requires, at a minimum, that the people perceive that the document is fundamentally just, and that some
institution be responsible for preserving that perception. It is too facile
to say that the amending process can suffice for this purpose. To begin
with, there are times when the amending process can only be invoked
too late. For example, the national attention focused on the first case
108. BERGER, supra note 1, at I10. See note 92 supra.
109. E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONINo 42 (1949). Similarly, Alexander

Bickel has argued: "If a constitution purports to settle, in detail and for all time, most of the issues
that are likely to be the grist of the political mill, it invites either abandonment or frequent amendment. The familiarity of amendment will breed a species of contempt and incapacitate the document for symbolic service." BICKEL, supra note 6, at 105.
110. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 1, at 288-89.
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involving the Scottsboro boys'I' was a reflection of the widespread belief that the defendants had been given a trial that was nothing more
than a sham. Although Berger categorically rejects Justice Harlan's
statement that "'The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that those [State] procedures be fundamentally fair in all
respects,' 112 it would have been a stunning, and conceivably fatal,
blow to the conception of the Constitution as fundamental law for the
Supreme Court to have held that while the trial of the Scottsboro boys
violated the most basic notions of fair procedure, it was not one of the
specific intentions of the framers of the due process clause to require
that the states observe fair procedures, and thus no relief was possible.
Nor would the adverse impact of that blow have been mitigated by an
assertion that if the general public now thought differently about what
the Constitution should require, they were free to ask their representatives to initiate an amendment after the executions had taken place.
In addition, Berger is far too willing to resign himself to the prospect that if the extraordinary majority necessary to amend the Constitution cannot be mustered, the original intention of the framers must be
retained and enforced, even if it grew out of sentiments of the grossest
racism or some other equally discredited attitude. He rejects the wise
and sound defense of Brown v. BoardofEducation"3 offered by Archibald Cox: "To have adhered to the doctrine of 'separate but equal'
would have ignored not only the revolution sweeping the world but the
moral sense of civilization. Law must be binding even upon the highest
court, but it must also meet the needs of men and match their [ethical]
sensibilities."" 4 Berger's response to this statement is: "I cannot bring
myself to believe that the Court may assume a power not granted in
order to correct an evil that the people were, and remain, unready to
cure." "5 He also decries the view that "the cumbersomeness of the
[amending] process authorizes the servants of the people informally to
amend the Constitution without consulting them!"' 16 Thus, if one more
than one-quarter of the states were unwilling to ratify an amendment
that was specifically intended to mean what the Fourteenth Amendment actually says, the vast majority of the nation would have to suffer
111. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
112. BERGER, supra note 1, at 213-14 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172
(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
113. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
114. Id. at 408 (quoting A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GovERNMENT 109-10 (1976) [herEinafter cited as Cox]).
115. Id. at 409.
116. Id at315-16.
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under a fundamental law that embodied and perpetuated what they
recognized as a fundamental injustice. That would hardly be compatible with the notion that the Constitution should reflect the best ideals
and finest aspirations of the nation. Under that approach, it might just
as easily reflect its basest prejudices-all in the name of limiting the
power of judges.
It is difficult to know what to say to someone who rejects the
thoughtful statement of Archibald Cox quoted above. Justice Black,
who advanced the same position now taken by Berger in a dissenting
opinion in 1965, observed in that opinion that "many good and able
men have eloquently spoken and written, sometimes in rhapsodical
strains, about the duty of this Court to keep the Constitution in tune
with the times.""' 7 It is pointless here to attempt to improve on those
"rhapsodical strains," particularly since Berger, whose scholarship is
quite comprehensive, has quoted the most persuasive of them,1 8 and
has dismissed them all because they permit some measure of judicial
policymaking. He writes:
It does not dispose of the uncomfortable historical facts to be
told that "the dead hand of the past need not and should not be
binding,"["19 1 that the Founders "should not rule us from their
graves." 120 1 To thrust aside the dead hand of the Framers is to thrust
aside the Constitution. The argument that new meanings may be
given to words employed by the Framers aborts their design; it
reduces the Constitution to an empty shell into
12 1 which each shifting
judicial majority pours its own preferences.
Of course the provisions of the Constitution ought to be treated
with respect and reverence. Of course judges ought not to be free to
manipulate its words at will to arrive at whatever results their personal
inclinations commend to them. Of course Madison, 122 Jefferson, 2 3
117. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
118. Eg., LEvy, supra note 37, at 17; Curtis, The Role of the Constitutional Text, in
SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 64-70 (E.Calm ed. 1954); McDougal & Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executiveor PresidentialAgreements: InterchangeableInstruments of NationalPol-

icy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 212-16, 290-306 (1945) [hereinafter cited as McDougal & Lans]; Miller,
An Inquiry into the Relevance of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers, With Special Emphasis
Upon the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 27 ARK.L. REV. 583 (1973) [hereinafter cited as

Miller].
119. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 143 (L. Levy ed. 1967).

120. Miller, supra note 118, at 601.
121. BERGER, supra note 1, at 314-15.
122. See note 50 supra.

123. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
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Hamilton,12 4 Marshall12 5 and others involved in the drafting or ratifica-

tion of the Constitution insisted that the document should be taken seriously, and George Washington, in his Farewell Address, urged that
modifications in the Constitution be brought about by "amendment,"
not by "usurpation."' 2 6 It was imperative to the preservation of the
union that the Constitution not be disregarded whenever one of its provisions proved inconvenient to some political or sectional faction. And
no less respect is due today to the words of the Constitution and the
intent of its framers. They are not lightly to be given less than controlling weight when the document is interpreted. Nevertheless, a constitution is intended to endure for ages to come. The dilemma presented by
these opposing considerations is nothing more than another instance of
the age-old legal problem of reconciling the essential need for stability
and security with the no less essential need for adaptability and growth.
Thus, it is not enough to advert to the need for fidelity to the original
intent of the framers or to insist upon devotion to the provisions of the
Constitution. For one thing, it is often possible to find "the same justices and the same statesmen, on different occasions for different
problems"' I 7 proclaiming, at one time, the case for stability and, at another time, the case for growth-as Berger demonstrates by showing
that those who may .have most effectively made the argument for a
flexible and adaptable Constitution have, on other occasions, taken the
opposite position. 2 8 The same justices and the same statesmen advocate both views because it is vital that both views be advocated. The
fundamental failure of Berger's book is that, while it makes one case
eloquently and fervently, it does not recognize the manifest essentiality
of the other. It reduces what should be an agonizing dilemma to a
straightforward issue of right and wrong.12 9 Berger sees no middle
ground between, for example, defining the word "citizens" as Chief
124. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, 507-09 (Modem Library ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton).
Significantly, although Berger uses Hamilton's essay as an argument for the limitation ofjudicial
power, BERGER, supra note 1, at 353-54, Hamilton was there arguing for the power of judicial

review as a means of allowing judges to control the power of the legislature, and to enhance their
own authority.
125. See note 40 supra.
126. 356 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 229 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940).

127. McDougal & Lans, supra note 118, at 214.
128. For this purpose, Berger focuses on Justices Marshall, Holmes and Frankfurter. See
BERGER, supra note 1, at 373-86.

129. Archibald Cox has written:
The dilemma [of reconciling the rule of law with the imperatives of justice] lies at the
root of Anglo-American jurisprudence. There have always been occasions when the
law to these objectives [justice and morality], have had to pay the
courts,
shape thethat
price oftorevealing
judges sometimes make law to suit the occasion. Nor should we
forget that not to pay tat price may even defeat the object of obtaining voluntary compliance, because law, to command consent, must deserve it.
Cox, supranote 114, at 110.
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Justice Taney did, to exclude blacks, and reducing the Constitution to
an empty shell. For those who think there is, because there must be, a
middle ground, he has nothing to say.
That the formal amending process is not, by itself, an adequate
vehicle for all constitutional change is a conclusion that is supported by
the evidence of history. Berger bravely states that had he been on the
Court when it was called on to decide the issues of whether the right to
vote or to serve on juries or to be free from a state-mandated system of
racial segregation was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, he
"should have felt constrained to hold that the relief sought lay outside
the confines of the judicial power,"'1 30 and his convictions appear sufficiently firm to have led him to do exactly that. But, happily, the men
who have actually served on the Supreme Court have not had such
strong resolve. Even those most committed to the philosophy of judicial
self-restraint have seen fit to stretch the words of the Constitution or to
depart from the original intent of the framers when the justification
seemed to them great enough. Thus, although Chief Justice John Marshall may have abjured the existence of judicial authority to change the
3
Constitution in his response to the critics of McCulloch v.Maryland,11
and may have written in a judicial opinion that "the intention of the
instrument must prevail,"'132 he nevertheless manifestly went beyond
the intent of the framers in holding that a state-granted charter was a
clause of article one, seccontract within the meaning of the contract
33
concedes.'
specifically
tion ten, as Berger
Other examples may be offered. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
who stands as a symbol of judicial self-restraint, not only wrote in Missouri v. Holland 34 one of the most powerful and moving statements
concerning the need for an adaptable Constitution, but also was willing
to invoke the concept of substantive due process when it proved necessary to defend freedom of speech against majority intolerance. The
changes in his position on the First Amendment are instructive. In Patterson v. Colorado,135 he had declared that "the main purpose" of the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech was to prohibit previous
restraints, and that it therefore did not "prevent the subsequent punish130. BERGER, supra note 1, at 412. See note 103 supra.
131. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 209 (G. Gunther ed.

1969).
132. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).

See note 40 supra.
133. BERGER, supranote 1, at 386. The leading case for Chief Justice Marshall's interpreta-

tion of the contract clause is Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
134. 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). See note 56 supra.
135. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
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ment of such [speech] as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare."' 36 However, during World War I, when federal and state sedition
statutes were utilized with dismaying vigor to imprison socialists and
pacifists who had the temerity to oppose the nation's participation in
the hostilities, 137 Justice Holmes evidently began to question whether
the scope of the guarantee intended by the framers-the prohibition of
only previous restraints' 38 -was adequate. In Schenck v. United
States,'39 which set forth the "clear and present danger" test, he said:
"It may well be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of
speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them
may have been the main purpose, as intimated in Patterson v.
Colorado."'4 While the free speech claims were rejected in Schenck
and in two subsequent cases in which Holmes wrote the majority opinions,' 4 ' by the end of 1919 he was prepared to invoke the "clear and
present danger" test in his dissent to a decision upholding the convictions and heavy sentences meted out to individuals who had printed
"poor and puny anonymities" in opposition to the use of Allied troops
to thwart the Russian Revolution. 42 And, by 1925, Justice Holmes had
come to the point where he could maintain that the Constitution prohibited the states from abridging freedom of speech-a clear instance
of substantive due process. 143 It should also not be forgotten that Justice Holmes wrote the opinion of the Court in the first case in which it
was held that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the right to vote, 144
a position45that Berger firmly maintains is contrary to the intent of the
framers.
Justice Louis Brandeis, whose credentials as a self-restrained jurist
are equally unimpeachable, joined Justice Holmes in his First Amend136. Id. at 462.
137. See generally Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 3-195 (1941).
138. For compelling evidence of this disheartening proposition, see generallyL. LEvY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
139. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

140. Id. at 51-52 (citation omitted).
141. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919).
142. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628-29 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In
Abrams, Justice Holmes wrote that history contradicted the view "that the First Amendment left
the common law as to seditious libel in force." Id at 630. But the history to which Justice Holmes
was referring was not the legislative history of the First Amendment, but that of the period following its adoption, for his evidence of that history was the nation's "repentance for the Sedition Act
of 1798." Id.
143. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J.. dissenting).
144. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
145. BERGER, supra note 1, at 166-67.
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ment dissents, and, in fact, preceded the latter in his willingness to hold
that the guarantee of free speech was applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.14 6 When the
question of the constitutionality of federal wiretapping came before the
Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis, in dissent, saW neither the failure of
the literal language of the Fourth Amendment to cover wiretaps nor
the absence of evidence that the framers intended any broader meaning
for the words as a barrier to holding the practice to be violative of the
Constitution as an unreasonable search and seizure.147 And it was Justice Brandeis who-as Alexander Bickel has informed us-wished to
add the following sentences to one of his judicial opinions, and was
restrained from doing so only because Chief Justice Taft, who joined,
the remainder of Justice Brandeis' opiion, said that he could not accede to them:
Our Constitution is not a strait-jacket. It is a living organism. As such
it is capable of growth-of expansion and of adaptation to new conditions .... Because our Constitution possesses the capacity of adas the fundamental law of an everaptation, it has endured
148
developing people.
The earliest cases holding state criminal procedures to be in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were not
written by justices bent on shaping the Constitution to fit their personal
predilections, although Berger dismisses this position as "a judicial
construct pure and simple; no such mandate can be drawn from the
history of the Amendment."' 4 9 Justice Holmes spoke for the Court in
Moore v. Dempsey, 50 which held that the Fourteenth Amendment
would be violated by a trial held in an atmosphere of mob violence
such "that the whole proceeding is a mask-that counsel, jury and
judge were swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion."' 5 Chief Justice Hughes spoke for a unanimous Court in Brown
v. Mississppi,'5 2 which reversed the murder convictions of three blacks
based upon confessions obtained by whipping them until they "con146. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 343 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
147. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
148. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 107. The opinion to which the sentences would have been
added was in United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 441-51 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting,
joined by Taft, C.J.). Although Justice Brandeis acceded to Chief Justice Taft's suggestion, he
stated in a note to the Chief Justice that he "believeld] strongly in the views expressed." BICKEL,
supra note 6, at 108.
149. BEROER, supra note 1, at 214.

150. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
151. Id. at 91.
152. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 5

fessed in every matter of detail as demanded by those present."' 53 The
Court held that the use of torture to obtain a confession was a violation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: "The rack and
torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand."' 54
It was Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, the author of the brilliant statement in support of judicial self-restraint in his dissent in the case of
UnitedStates v. Butler,155 who, two years later, added a footnote to his
opinion for the Court in the Carolene Products case 15 6 suggesting the
propriety of judicia -activism in cases involving restrictions on participation in the political process or laws aimed at discrete and insular
minorities, and who alone dissented on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds when the Court at first upheld a state law requiring school
children to salute the flag.' 57 When that decision was later reversed in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,5 ' it was Justice
Robert Jackson, whose attack on judicial policymaking is quoted with
approval by Berger, 159 who wrote the majority opinion.
By any measure, Justice Felix Frankfurter was the most outspoken
opponent of judicial policymaking of any justice who has sat on the
Court in the last forty years.1 60 Yet Berger points out that his judicial
philosophy was not sufficient "to overcome his confidence in his own
wisdom when he ascended to the bench."' 6 1 Berger's disappointment is
based on the evidence brought to light by Richard Kluger in his study
of the events culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education 62 showing that Justice Frankfurter played an instrumental role in bringing about the final result. 1o3 "Frankfurter,"
Berger writes, "the sworn foe of subjective judgment, who disclaimed
enforcement of his own 'private view rather than the consensus of society's opinion,' had made up his mind 'from the day the cases were
153. Id. at 282.
154. Id. at 285-86. One may wonder whether, had Berger been on the Court in 1936, he
would really have contended that because the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
intend the due process clause to apply to state criminal procedures, the state could as far as federal
constitutional law was concerned, substitute the "rack and torture chamber" for the witness stand.
155. 297 U.S. 1, 78-88 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
156. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
157. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601-07 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting).
158. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
159. JACKsON, supra note 65, quoted in BERGER, supra, note 1, at 2, 281, 298.
160. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-71 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
161. BERGER, supra note 1, at 386.
162. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 596-602, 683-87 (1976) [hereinafter cited as KLUGER].
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taken' that segregation must go!"' 164 And he did so despite the fact that
"judges are not required by Article VI, § 3, to take an oath to do justice
but rather 'to support this Constitution' "16 5 -that is, in Berger's view,
to observe the original intent of the framers.
Berger finds it disheartening that judges who claim to eschew a
policymaking role may sometimes act differently:
To do what one disclaims as he acts is a reproach to any man, all the
more when it is done by the oracles of the law whom we are urged to
regard as the "national conscience." Of no one should more fastidious morality be required than of the Supreme Court.' 66
But none of the justices mentioned above is open to the charge of hypocrisy or immorality for the way he exercised judicial power in the
cases discussed. The role of a Supreme Court justice demands a measure of schizophrenia. It requires recognition of the need for stability
and adherence to the text of the Constitution, and, where possible, the
ascertainable intent of its framers. But there are also times when it is
appropriate, if not necessary, to ignore the intent of the framers and
even to give a strained construction to the words of the text in the interests of justice or urgent necessity. Refusal to be bound by the original
intent in such cases is all the more justifiable when the framers used
general words capable of being expanded to cover more than the specific matters that they had directly in mind. When we look back on the
last six decades of American constitutional history, it is hard to come to
the conclusion that the dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in the
free speech cases, or Justice Brandeis' argument that the Fourth
Amendment should be interpreted to include protection against wiretapping, or decisions such as Nixon v. Herndon,167 Home Building &
Loan Association v. Blaisdell,16s Brown v. Mississ#7pi,6 9 West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette'7" or Brown v. Board of
Education,t7 1 represent unworthy moments for the judiciary. On the
contrary, most students of constitutional history would be likely to
164. BERGER, supra note 1,at 129. The first internal quotation, slightly modified to fit grammatically into Bergers sentence, is from Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Louisiana ex
rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The second is

from KLUGER, supranote 163,
law clerks.
165. BERGER, supra note
166. Id. at 386.
167. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
168. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
169. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
170. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
171. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

at 601, quoting a statement of one of Justice Frankfurter's former
1, at 289.
See note 144 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 51-57 and accompanying text supra.
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See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
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agree that the Constitution and the polity are stronger because of them.
If the choice is, as Berger frames it, between maintaining a system that
tolerates some room for judicial policymaking and thus runs the risk of
abuses, or one which eliminates such policymaking altogether and thus
makes impossible decisions such as those listed above, most persons
would probably choose the former.
Berger understands that his arguments will not be persuasive to
students of constitutional law, but he assumes this is merely because of
"their rapture over the Warren Court's adoption of their predilections." 72 On the other hand, he believes that the American public is
not so enthusiastic about the Warren Court's accomplishments that it
would be willing to abandon the fundamental principles of a democratic society in order to accommodate judicial discretion in the interpretation of the Constitution:
Were the issue put squarely to the American people whether they
would elect to have the Court strike the "shackles" of the past or to
live under the constraints of the Constitution, I doubt not that they
would resoundingly prefer the
173 "idiosyncratic purposes of the Framers" to those of the Justices.
However, how one asks the question makes all the difference. If the
American people were to be asked whether the Supreme Court should
decide on the basis of the Constitution or of the justices' personal preferences, an overwhelming majority undoubtedly would select the former. If, however, they were asked whether the Court should interpret
the words of the Constitution according to current common understanding or according to the specific meaning intended by the framers,
the vote would be much closer, and, if the latter alternative were altered so that the choice was whether the Court should read the words of
the Constitution according to the specific meaning intended by the
framers 190years ago, the vote would likely swing to the other side.
And, if the question were asked whether the Court should interpret the
Constitution according to the intent of the framers, even if changed
circumstances might cause that interpretation to yield substantial injustice, or according to the meaning that would yield what the judges feel
would be the most just result compatible with the language of the text,
one could easily anticipate an overwhelming vote for the latter option.
In the final paragraph of his book, Berger states that the Court's
policy making powers "are self-conferred and survive only because the
172. Id. at 332 (emphasis in original).
173. Id. at 319-20. The term "idiosyncratic purposes of the framers" is from McDougal &
Lans, supra note 118, at 212.
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American people are unaware that there is a yawning gulf between judicial professions and practice." 74 But this assertion is almost certainly
wrong on the latter point, and if, as Berger claims, the power of judicial
review was conferred, and not usurped,175 it is wrong on the former
point as well, for the framers could not have been so naive as to believe
that they could confer the power of judicial review without also necessarily conferring policymaking power. Yet if Berger's conclusion presupposes a remarkable degree of naivete on the part of the framers, it
presumes an equally large measure of naivete on the part of the American public. It is not likely that many literate laymen believe that there
are objectively right answers to most of the questions of constitutional
law that make their way to the Supreme Court, even if Berger seems to
believe that there are. If that were true, there would be no reason for
split decisions, except the individual obtuseness of particular justices. It
is very unlikely that any substantial number of the American people
understand that they are supposed to want the Court to adhere strictly
to the original intent of the framers rather than provide a reasonable
and just construction of the actual words of the Constitution. Laymen
are aware that the Constitution is 190 years old, and that answers to
modem problems are likely to be more satisfactory if they are given by
the living who know something of the nature of these problems than by
the framers, who could have no conception of them. Naturally, the
public would not want the justices simply to read their own policy
choices into the law as a matter of course, but it is very unlikely that it
would feel deceived, and would want to strip the Court of its power,
were it to learn what it probably already senses-that the Supreme
Court may sometimes read the language of the Constitution in a way
that comports with the demands of justice, as broadly understood,
rather than with the intent of the framers, even when that can be
clearly ascertained.
It is natural for one who has devoted oneself, as Raoul Berger has,
to a long and painstaking examination of the legislative history of a
constitutional provision to want that study to yield more than mere
data to be accepted or rejected at the discretion of those who must interpret it. It is heady to think that if one can provide conclusive proof of
what the framers intended with respect to a given constitutional provision, the meaning of that provision can be forever fixed in the terms
established by one's research unless later changed by a formal constitutional amendment. It is therefore not surprising that Berger, whose skill
174. BERGER, supra note 1, at 417-18.
175. See notes 5-7 and accompanying text supra.
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as a constitutional historian is extraordinary, and who has no diffidence about presenting his views as truth, would wish, in Alan Westin's
phrase, "to carry off a coup from the library stacks and change the tides
of judicial power."' 7 6 But legislative history is no more likely to bring
"the search for objectivity in constitutional law" to a successful conclusion than any of the other formulas that have up to now been proposed. 7 7 Even in the cases in which that history is relatively clear, it is
unlikely that judges would deem themselves bound by it if doing so
would result in an interpretation that would generally be considered
unjust or inadequate to current conditions. Moreover, where the framers have chosen to use general words rather than to spell out their intent precisely, it is evidence that they, too, did not want future
generations to be permanently bound by the history of their
deliberations.
The meaning of a constitutional provision is too vital to be decided
by any formula that would exclude moder-day judgment-and, given
judicial review, that judgment will most probably be exercised by the
justices of the Supreme Court. Of course their judgment may be mistaken, and we may suffer for it, but we are likely in the long run to
suffer less than if judgment is excluded from the process of interpretation. It is because Berger would disallow all such judgment, would
make history decisive, and would force reliance on the amending process for all constitutional change that it may confidently be predicted
that Government by Judiciarywill not prove to be an influential book.
"It would be easy," Edward Corwin once wrote, "to imagine interpreters with a rigidity of mind that would soon have infected the Constitution with . . . premature senility."' 178 Although vigor, eloquence, and
indefatigable scholarship shine throughout this book, a rigidity of mind
is clearly present, and premature senility is certainly the fate that would
befall the Constitution if Berger's prescriptions were followed in practice. That this truly prodigious effort to rehabilitate the "original intent" theory of constitutional interpretation ultimately fails is
overwhelming proof that the theory is basically untenable. It is regrettable that Berger chose to commit himself so completely to this theory
that he blinded himself to its limitations and ignored completely the
fatal difficulties in the concept of changeless constitutional provisions.
His scholarship deserves to be channeled in more profitable directions.
176. Westin, supra note 6, at 33.
177. See Braden, The Searchfor Objectivity in ConstitutionalLaw, 57 YALE L.. 571 (1948).
178. E. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 86 (1938).

